Abstract. We consider average-case strengthenings of the traditional assumption that coNP is not contained in AM. Under these assumptions, we rule out generic and potentially non-black-box constructions of various cryptographic primitives (e.g., one-way permutations, collision-resistant hash-functions, constant-round statistically hiding commitments, and constant-round black-box zero-knowledge proofs for NP) from one-way functions, assuming the security reductions are black-box.
Introduction
In the past four decades, many cryptographic tasks have been put under rigorous treatment in an eort to realize these tasks under minimal assumptions. In particular, one-way functions are widely regarded as the most basic cryptographic primitive; their existence is implied by most other cryptographic tasks. Presently, one-way functions are known to imply schemes such as private-key encryption [GM84, GGM86, HILL99] , pseudo-random generators [HILL99] , statisticallybinding commitments [Nao91] , statistically-hiding commitments [NOVY98, HR07] and zero-knowledge proofs [GMW91] . At the same time, some other tasks still have no known constructions based on one-way functions (e.g., key agreement schemes or collision-resistant hash functions).
Following the seminal paper by Impagliazzo and Rudich [IR88] , many works have addressed this phenomenon by demonstrating black-box separations, which rules out constructions of a cryptographic task using the underlying primitive as a black-box. For instance, Impagliazzo and Rudich rule out black-box constructions of key-agreement protocols (and thus also trapdoor predicates) from one-way functions; Simon [Sim98] rules out black-box constructions of collisionresistant hash functions from one-way functions. Furthermore, these impossibility results are unconditional. In this paper, we directly focus on providing lower bounds for non-blackbox constructions of cryptographic primitives from one-way functions. We emphasize that although we consider non-black-box constructions, we still assume Turing (i.e., black-box) security reductions. For some of our results, we heavily leverage the existing literature on the impossibility of basing cryptography on NP hardness (these works also directly consider a Turing reduction of cryptographic primitives from NP). Perhaps surprisingly, we also make extensive use of known black-box separations. In other words, we demonstrate that some blackbox separations can be modied to give further insight into the separation of cryptographic primitives.
Before stating our theorems, we rst discuss our assumptions. Assumptions are necessary for non-black-box separations assuming black-box reductions; to show that a primitive P cannot be constructed using one-way functions, we must at least assume that a weak notion of so-called somewhere-uninvertable one-way functions existi.e. functions that cannot be inverted on all input lengths (as opposed to innitely many lengths as in the traditional denition of one-way functions).
1 As one of the main contributions of the paper, we introduce general assumptions that we believe are reasonable, and are useful in establishing a variety of non-black-box separations.
Our Assumptions
Assumption 1. Dist 1sided -coNP ⊆ Heur 1/ poly AM is an average-case extension of the well-studied (and widely believed) classical assumption coNP ⊆ AM. Briey, Dist 1sided -coNP contains all coNP languages coupled with an eciently samplable distribution over the no instances of the language. Such a language is considered to be in Heur 1/ poly AM if there exists an AM (constant-round) protocol that accepts the language, with the relaxation that soundness only needs to hold with high probability over the no instances, as measured by the given distribution. As we prove later, the assumption is equivalent to the existence of an eciently computable function f that is not heuristically co-range veriablethat is, there does not exist an AM protocol proving that an element is outside the range of f , where soundness holds with high probability for a random instance f (x). In addition to these theorems, we again stress the following philosophical contribution: with the right assumptions, not only are non-black-box separation results possible, many such separations can be based on existing techniques. For example, the black-box separation results of [Sim98] , [HHRS07] and [PV10] are essentially upgraded to non-black-box separations using our framework.
Our Techniques
Regarding the rst assumption, Dist 1sided -coNP ⊆ Heur 1/ poly AM, our separation results are largely based on previous works in the literature of separating cryptography from NP hardness, specically ruling out constructions of one-way permutations [Bra83] , size-veriable one-way functions [AGGM06] and publiccoin strongly witness-indistinguishable proofs [Pas06] . These works follow a common pattern: they take a (candidate) Turing security reduction of some cryptographic primitive P from NP, transform the reduction into an AM protocol, and conclude that coNP ⊆ AM, an unlikely consequence. By adapting their techniques, we show that a (candidate) Turing security reduction of the same primitive P from a one-way function can be transformed into an AM protocol that inverts the one-way function, and therefore the AM protocol may verify the co-range of f . This is a contradiction (not surprising since our assumption is an average case generalization of coNP ⊆ AM).
Our second assumption is used in a dierent fashion. Having justied the assumption that there exist one-way functions secure against SAM = SAM O(1) , it follows that any cryptographic primitive P whose security can be broken using SAM cannot be based on one-way functions. This is because a Turing security reduction of primitive P from a one-way function f directly gives an algorithm that inverts f by using the SAM oracle, if SAM O(1) can be used to break the security of primitive P . The SAM O(1) oracle (as well as its variants) is particularly interesting in this aspect, since it is originally studied in the setting of black-box separations. Therefore, we know from previous works that in a relativized world with the SAM O(1) oracle, there do not exist collision-resistant hash functions [Sim98] , constant-round statistically hiding commitments [HHRS07] , and zeroknowledge proofs for all of NP [PV10] . In a similar spirit, other on black-box separations can also be extended also to non-black-box separations; the work then lies in justifying the resulting new assumption.
A note on Turing reductions. In this work, we only consider constructions with
Turing security reductions; that is, reductions that use the adversary (supposedly breaking the security of the construction) as a black box. The non-black-box simulation technique of Barak [Bar01] demonstrates how the code of the adversary can be used in security proofs for certain interactive zero-knowledge protocols.
Such non-black-box reductions might potentially also be useful in analyzing the security of other cryptographic tasks.
However, as we argue, in the context of basing cryptographic primitives on one another, Turing reductions provide a semantically stronger notion of security than non-black-box reductions. The existence of a Turing reduction from a primitive P to a primitive Q implies that any physical devicewhich might rely on physical phenomenathat breaks the security of primitive Q, can be used to break the security of primitive P . With a non-black-box security reduction, we would instead require an explicit description of the code of the attack on primitive Q. Such descriptions might be hard to nd: consider, for instance, a human-aided computation, where a human is interacting with a computer program in order to break a crypto system; 5 getting an explicit description of the attack would require providing an explicit (and short) description of the human brain.
Preliminaries
We assume familiarity with common complexity classes such as NP, AM, etc., as well as common cryptographic primitives such as one-way functions (OWF), collision-resistant hash-functions (CRH), zero-knowledge proofs (ZK), and witnessindistinguishable proofs (WI).
Let
[n] denotes the set {1, . . . , n}. Given an interactive protocol (P, V ) (a pair of interactive Turing machines), let P, V (x) denote the output of V (the verier) at the end of an execution with P (the prover), on common input x. Given a function f : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} * and a polynomial q(n), we say g is q(n) concatenations of f to mean that for x 1 , . . . , 
Hardness Amplication of One-Way Functions
The following lemma on hardness amplication of one-way functions is due to
Lemma 4 ([Yao82]) Let f : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} * be an eciently computable function. Given any polynomial q(n), let g be q(n) concatenations of f . Then there is a PPT oracle machine A O such that whenever O is an oracle that inverts g with non-negligible probability, i.e., there exists some polynomial p(n) such that for some set of n's,
then A O inverts f with probability 1 − 1/q(n), i.e., for the same set of n's,
Dist-coNP and D only sample instances not in L.
is in Heur 1/ poly AM if for every polynomial q, there exists an AM (i.e., constant-round public-coin) protocol (P, V ) such that:
Soundness: For every n ∈ N and every machine P * , with probability 1
Remark 3. As usual, the choice of 2/3 and 1/3 is arbitrary and can be amplied to 1 − 2 −n and 2 −n . Intuitively, the soundness condition means that L is almost in AM, except for a fraction of instances inL that is sampled with (arbitrarily small) polynomial probability.
Remark 4. In a related work, Feige, Kim and Ofek give positive results in refuting restricted random coSAT instances on average [FKO06] . The main dierence between the notion of average refutation and our denition of heuristic veriability is in where errors are allowed. An average refutation algorithm may not refute a random unsatisable instance with small probability, but will never refute a satisable instance (i.e., perfect soundness). On a philosophical level, the work of [FKO06] gives a distribution of coSAT instances that may indeed be heuristically veriable.
The complexity assumption we consider is Dist 1sided -coNP ⊆ Heur 1/ poly AM, which is a strengthening of the more standard assumption that Dist-coNP ⊆ Heur 1/ poly AM, which in turn is the heuristic analog of coNP ⊆ AM.
Relation to other assumptions. To get a more concrete handle on our assumption, we prove that Dist 1sided -coNP ⊆ Heur 1/ poly AM is equivalent to the existence of an eciently computable function f that is not heuristically co-range veriable,
i.e., there does not exist an AM protocol proving that an instance is outside the range of f , where soundness holds only with high probability with respect to random instances of f (x). We then present several candidates for such a function (such as AES [DR02] and Learning Parity with Noise [BFKL93] ). Using this equivalence, we also show that Dist 1sided -coNP ⊆ Heur 1/ poly AM is implied by the existence of pseudorandom generators secure against BPP(Promise(AM ∩ coAM)). 6
Heuristic co-Range Veriable Functions
Given a function f , consider the language Range f = f (x) | x ∈ {0, 1} * . Denition 7. f is heuristically co-range veriable if for any polynomial p, there exists an AM (i.e., constant-round public-coin) protocol (P, V ) such that:
Completeness: For every y / ∈ Range f , Pr[ P, V (y) = 1] ≥ 2/3. Soundness: For every n ∈ N and every machine P * , with probability 1−1/p(n) 
-coNP and (L, D) / ∈ Heur 1/ poly AM, and let t(n) be a bound on the random bits required to eciently sample from D n . Dene f on input x ∈ {0, 1} t(n) to be the result of sampling from D n given randomness x (for other input lengths, f may treat part of the input as padding). f is an ecient function since D is eciently samplable, and f is not heuristically co-range veriable precisely because (L, D) / ∈ Heur 1/ poly AM.
The statement f is heuristically co-range veriable can be viewed as an average-case (heuristic) variant of the statement Range f ∈ coAM. (Also observe that if f is eciently computable then Range f ∈ NP ⊆ AM.) We believe that the existence of such functions is a reasonable average-case generalization of SAT / ∈ coAM: Just as it seems unlikely that there exist AM proofs for proving that a string is outside an arbitrary NP set, it seems unlikely that there is a AM proof for proving that a string is outside the range an arbitrary eciently computable function, even if we only require soundness to hold for a random string in the range of the function.
Candidate functions that are not heuristic co-range veriable. Although many traditional one-way functions (based for example on the hardness of factoring, RSA, discrete log [Rab80], or lattice-based problems [GG00,AR05]) are co-range veriable, there are also "natural" one-way functions for which we do not know of co-range veriability protocols. We here briey discuss a few functions that are not known to be heuristically co-range veriable.
Generalized AES: AES is a permutation on 128 bits [DR02] ; that is, for a 128-bit seeds, AES s is a permutation on dened on {0, 1} n as Ax where A is a random m × n binary matrix. Given the matrix A and a codeword y, it is easy to nd the corresponding message x when m ≥ n. However, the problem of nding x becomes hard when only a noisy codeword is given. The learning parity with noise (LPN) problem requires nding a random secret x, given (A, Ax + e) where e is a short (binary) error vector. The worst-case variant of the LPN problem (i.e. given a set of equations Ax = s to nd x that maximally satises the equations) is known to be NP-hard even to approximate [Hås01] . The average-case version of LPN is also believed to be intractable: the LPN p,m assumption [BFKL93] states that for p ∈ (0, 1 2 ) and polynomial m, there is no PPT algorithm that nds x with more than negligible probability given (A, Ax + e mod 2) where A is a random m × n binary matrix and every component of e is set to 1 independently with probability p. It seems like a reasonable strengthening of the LPN assumption to say that the function x → (A, Ax + e mod 2) is not heuristically co-range veriable, for some choices of m and p. In other words, there is no AM-proof showing that a binary string y is far from Ax for any x, even if soundness only holds for randomly perturbed codewords.
Pseudo-random Generators secure against BPP(Promise(AM ∩ coAM)): While not a specic function, we show that this class of PRGs are not heuristically co-range veriable.
Denition 9. Let U n denote the distribution of uniform bit-strings of length n. A collection of eciently computable functions G = {g n : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n+1 } n∈N is a PRG secure against BPP(Promise(AM∩coAM)) if no PPT adversary with a Promise(AM ∩ coAM) oracle can distinguish the ensembles {g n (U n )} n∈N and {U n+1 } n∈N with non-negligible probability in n.
n+1 be a PRG secure against BPP(Promise(AM ∩ coAM)). Then g is not heuristically range veriable. Proof. Assume for contradiction that g is heuristically range veriable. By the denition of heuristic range veriability, there is a AM protocol (P, V ) such that on input g(x) for a uniformly random x ∈ {0, 1} n , V rejects g(x) with probability at least 1−1/n. Let S = {x ∈ {0, 1} n | Pr[V rejects g(x)] ≤ 1/n} (i.e., the set of x where V fails to reject g(x)). Then we must have
Let T = {g(x) | x ∈ S}, i.e., the set of inputs where (P, V ) has high soundness error. Now consider the promise problem Π = (Π Y , Π N ) = (Range g − T, Range g ). Note that Π is trivially in NP ⊆ AM, and that Π ∈ coAM by denition of T (via protocol (P, V )). Therefore Π ∈ AM ∩ coAM. We now describe a polynomial-time distinguisher D that has oracle access to a decision procedure for the the promise problem Π. On input y, D simply outputs Π(y). To show that D is a good distinguisher for g, observe that
On the other hand,
Claim 10 together with forthcoming theorems yields the following trade-o:
if certain cryptographic primitives can be based on OWFs, then there does not exist PRGs secure against BPP(Promise(AM ∩ coAM)).
3.2 Consequences of Dist 1sided -coNP ⊆ Heur 1/ poly AM The assumption Dist 1sided -coNP ⊆ Heur 1/ poly AM implies some impossibility results on basing cryptographic primitives on one-way functions. First, we provide an outline of our proof framework.
Recall that we consider arbitrary non-black-box (and even non explicit)
constructions based on one-way functions, but restrict our attention to Turing (black-box) security reductions. This means a primitive P constructed from a one-way function f is accompanied by a PPT oracle reduction R O , such that whenever O is an oracle that breaks the security of P , R O inverts the f with non-negligible probability. We will show that for certain primitives P and respective oracles O that break the security of P , the reduction R O can be emulated in an AM protocol, allowing the verier of the AM protocol to invert the one-way function. Coupled with the Yao's amplication lemma (Lemma 4), the verier can actually invert f with very high probability, and therefore heuristically verify the co-range of f (by checking for a lack of inverses).
We present the lower-bound result for one-way permutations and Strong WI Construction: There is a mapping that takes the description of any polynomialtime function f (candidate OWF) and outputs the description of a permutation φ = φ f (candidate OWP). Reduction: For any polynomial-time function f , there is a PPT oracle algorithm R f such that whenever O inverts φ, i.e., there is a polynomial p such that Pr x←{0,1}
, there is some polynomial p such that
The following theorem is proved using our framework combined with the work of [Bra83] .
Theorem 12 If OWPs can be based on OWFs, then Dist 1sided -coNP ⊆ Heur 1/ poly AM (contradicting our assumption).
Proof. Suppose that OWPs can be based on OWFs. We will show that every eciently computable function is heuristically co-range veriable. Fix any ecient function f and polynomial q(n) (as in the denition of heuristically co-range veriability), and dene g to be q(n) concatenations of f . By assumption, there exists a permutation P g and an ecient security reduction R g such that, given an oracle O that inverts φ inverts g, R O g inverts g with non-negligible probability.
Using Lemma 4, we can construct a new ecient reductionR f that, given an oracle O that inverts φ inverts g,R O f inverts f with probability 1 − 1/q(n). Next we recall from [Bra83] an AM protocol that allows the verier to runR f without access to O. The verier start by sending the prover a suciently long random string to act as the random tape ofR f . The prover then runsR f with the given randomness, solving oracle queries as needed. WhenR f terminates, the prover sends the output ofR f as well as any oracle query-answer pairs encountered in the execution ofR f to the verier. The verier can check the validity of the oracle query-answer pairs, and the validity of the execution using the given oracle query-answer pairs. On common input y, the verier accepts if and only ifR f (y) fails to nd an inverse.
Completeness: If y / ∈ Range f , and if the prover simulatesR f (y) honestly, then the verier will always accept the simulation, and of courseR f will never nd an inverse to y under f . Hence we have completeness probability 1. Soundness: We may assume that the verier accepts the execution ofR f (y)
provided by the (possibly cheating) prover. In this case, the simulated execution ofR f (y) is identical to a real execution ofR O f (y) for a perfect oracle O that answers all queries correctly; this is because every oracle has exactly one answer. Therefore:
By an averaging argument, we have that with probability at least 1 − 3/q(n) over a random x ∈ {0, 1}
in which case the verier would reject.
This concludes that f is heuristically co-range veriable.
Remark 5. The diculty of extending Theorem 12 to other cryptographic primitives comes from constructing an AM protocol. For many primitives (e.g., collections of trapdoor one-way functions), an oracle that breaks the security of the primitive suers from two caveats: some queries have no answers (which cannot be checked by the verier), and some queries have multiple answers (which allow a cheating prover to adaptively select the answer). These diculties are well known; see [BT03, AGGM06, HMX10] .
Theorem 12 can be extended beyond one-way permutations. For example, it can rule out basing certied collection of (trapdoor) permutations on one-way functions [BY96] . In this case, an oracle query consists of a candidate permutation description and a candidate image. The verier can check whether each description is indeed a valid permutation in the collection (certiable), and if so expect a unique inverse of the given image. (We may even extend the denition of certied to mean certiable under an AM protocol.)
Another example is to rule out basing size-veriable, polynomial-sized preimage one-way functions on one-way functions [AGGM06] . In this case, sizeveriable one-way functions allow the verier to check the pre-image size of any oracle query (in particular the verier checks whether a pre-image exists). Then, the verier may ask the prover to provide all polynomially many pre-images to force a unique answer.
On Basing Public-Coin Strongly Witness Indistinguishable Proofs on OWFs Using the same framework, we rule out the possibility of basing O(1)-round public-coin strongly witness-indistinguishable proofs (Strong-WI AM) for languages in NP on OWFs. Below, we provide the result and brief overview of the proof. The complete proof will appear in the full version.
The denition of basing Strong-WI AM proofs on OWFs can be extended similarly to OWPs. Roughly speaking, for any language L, there exists a mapping from the description of any function f to a protocol (P On a high-level, [Pas06] shows how to construct a game G f from any function f using a Strong-WI AM protocol for NP languages based on f such that there exists a reduction from breaking the game to inverting the function f . Additionally, he shows that a worst-case breaking oracle for G f can be simulated using an AM protocol. We obtain our result using the same game G f but instead of using any one-way function f , we use the function g obtained from any language (L, D) ∈ Dist 1sided -coNP as in the proof for OWP. Since a worst-case breaker can be simulated using an AM protocol, following the proof technique from Theorem 12, it essentially follows that (L, D) ∈ Heur 1/ poly AM. In this section we explore our second assumption: the existence of one-way functions that cannot be inverted by PPT Otherwise, SAM d(n) outputs ⊥. The role of r in the query is to obtain new and independent samples for each r and to allow a verier to obtain the same sample query by querying on the same r. 
In this work, we focus on the SAM O(1) and in the rest of the paper, we refer to this oracle simply by SAM.
Denition 15. We say that a language L is in BPP SAM if there exists an oracle PPT machine M such that the following holds:
The second assumption that we consider to establish non black-box lower bounds is the existence of one-way functions that are secure against PPT SAM .
We justify our assumption in the next section.
7 It suces to consider an oracle that merely outputs τ , however, we consider SAM that additionally outputs transi−1 :: ai for ease of exposition. Completeness: If x ∈ L, Pr[ P, V (x) = 1] ≥ 2/3. Soundness: For every n ∈ N and every machine P * , with probability 1 Let t(n) be a bound on the randomness required to eciently sample from D n , dene f on input x ∈ {0, 1} t(n) to be the result of sampling from D n given randomness x, and let g = g q be q(n) concatenations of f . By assumption, there is a PPT oracle algorithm R such that R SAM inverts g with polynomial probability. By Lemma 4, we can further construct a PPT oracle algorithmR such thatR SAM inverts f with probability 1 − 1/q(n).
By the work of Haitner et. al [HMX10] , the reductionR can be simulated in an interactive proof (P, V ) where the P is an ecient algorithm with access to an NP oracle. Specically, using Theorem 5.2 of [HMX10] 8 , with parameter δ = 1/q, (P, V ) has two properties:
Completeness: (P, V ) has completeness error 1/q(n) (the probability that V aborts).
Soundness: For any (possibly cheating) prover P * , if V does not abort, P * , V (y)
(the output of V ) and the output ofR SAM (y) has statistical dierence at most 1/q(n).
We modify the protocol so that V on input y accepts if and only if V does not abort during the simulation ofR, and thatR does not nd an inverse of y under f . The resulting protocol shows that (L, D) ∈ Heur 1/ poly IP[PPT NP ]:
Completeness: On input y ∈ L, i.e., y / ∈ Range f , V only rejects during the simulation ofR becauseR can never nd an inverse to y. Therefore V rejects with probability at most 1/q(n). Soundness: Let P * be an arbitrary machine. On a random input y / ∈ L distributed according to D n , i.e., y = f (x) for a random x ∈ {0, 1}
would nd an inverse of y with probability 1 − 1/q(n). Therefore, if V does not reject the simulation ofR provided by P * , V would nd an inverse of y with probability at least 1 − 2/q(n). By an averaging argument, with probably at least 1 − 3/q(n) over choosing y from D n , Pr[ P * , V (y) = 0] ≥ 2/3. exists. Since any length-compressing function with high-probability has collisions for uniformly chosen inputs, SAM breaks any CRH. We remark that it suces to consider the potentially weaker SAM 1 -oracle to break CRHs.
As a consequence, we obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 18 Assuming the existence of one-way functions that are secure against PPT SAM , we have that worst-case CRHs cannot be based on OWFs.
As a corollary, we also obtain (a potentially weaker statement) that worst- BPP have constant-round public-coin black-box zero-know-ledge protocols.
In [PV10] , this lower bound was extended to fully black-box constructions of black-box zero-knowledge proofs (that could be private-coin) based on one-way functions. More precisely, they show that only languages decidable by oracle PPT machines with oracle access to SAM π (for random permutation π) can have constant-round fully black-box zero-knowledge proofs.
On a high-level, they establish this lower-bound, by providing a transformation that takes any private-coin zero-knowledge proof based on OWFs and produces a public-coin zero-knowledge proof in a SAM π -relativized world and then concluding using the result of Goldreich-Krawczyk for public-coin protocols. Based on the result of [PV10] , we obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 20 Assume the existence of one-way functions that are secure w.r. 
